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Abstract
Recent studies have shown that perceiving the pain of others activates brain regions in the observer associated with both
somatosensory and affective-motivational aspects of pain, principally involving regions of the anterior cingulate and
anterior insula cortex. The degree of these empathic neural responses is modulated by racial bias, such that stronger neural
activation is elicited by observing pain in people of the same racial group compared with people of another racial group.
The aim of the present study was to examine whether a more general social group category, other than race, could similarly
modulate neural empathic responses and perhaps account for the apparent racial bias reported in previous studies. Using a
minimal group paradigm, we assigned participants to one of two mixed-race teams. We use the term race to refer to the
Chinese or Caucasian appearance of faces and whether the ethnic group represented was the same or different from the
appearance of the participant’ own face. Using fMRI, we measured neural empathic responses as participants observed
members of their own group or other group, and members of their own race or other race, receiving either painful or non-
painful touch. Participants showed clear group biases, with no significant effect of race, on behavioral measures of implicit
(affective priming) and explicit group identification. Neural responses to observed pain in the anterior cingulate cortex,
insula cortex, and somatosensory areas showed significantly greater activation when observing pain in own-race compared
with other-race individuals, with no significant effect of minimal groups. These results suggest that racial bias in neural
empathic responses is not influenced by minimal forms of group categorization, despite the clear association participants
showed with in-group more than out-group members. We suggest that race may be an automatic and unconscious
mechanism that drives the initial neural responses to observed pain in others.
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Introduction
Empathy is defined as the ability to comprehend and vicariously
share the feelings and thoughts of other people, according to the
perception-action model [1]. These feelings have an evolutionary
role fomenting altruistic behaviours [2] and act as a key motivator
in help and co-operation [3]. They are the proximate mechanism
by which an individual perceives and shares in the distress of
another person [4]. Hence, empathy may have an evolutionary
origin as a mechanism selected to foment altruistic behaviours in
human societies toward a common welfare [2].
Recent studies have shed light on the neural mechanisms that
underlie empathic feelings, in particular empathy elicited by the
perception of pain in others. Imaging studies have shown that
when people see or imagine the pain of another person, they map
that observed pain onto their own brain network which is
activated during firsthand experience, as if they were vicariously
experiencing the pain (e.g. [4–10]). The areas typically showing an
empathic neural response to observed pain include somatosensory
cortex (e.g. [6,11–15]), and areas involved in the motivational-
affective dimension in the pain matrix such as bilateral anterior
insula (AI) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (e.g. [4,11,13,16–
22]). Thus, there is a ‘‘shared representation’’ between the self and
the other in pain that may be the basis of the affective empathic
feelings.
Nevertheless, there is converging evidence to suggest that
empathy in humans is more complex than a mere resonance with
the target’s painful state. Indeed, cognitive and affective factors
can modulate the activation of neural patterns in empathy
[7,17,22,23]. Furthermore, recent imaging studies have found
that social and contextual factors can also regulate empathic
neural responses to others’ pain [10,11,24–28], including race of
the target person [29–34]. This racial bias has been seen not just in
empathy for pain, but also in empathic responses to facial
emotions [33,35]. Such studies build on evidence that racial bias is
a potent modulator of neural responses underlying many social
behaviours [36–41].
In a recent study, reduced neural empathic activity was found
when participants viewed people of another race receiving a
painful touch compared with people of the same race [34]. In that
study, Caucasian and Chinese participants were scanned while
they watched video clips of Caucasian or Chinese actors, with a
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neutral facial expression, receiving either painful or non-painful
touch on their cheek (with a syringe needle or cotton-bud
respectively). Notably, empathic pain activity in the anterior
cingulate cortex and left insula was significantly less when
participants viewed painful touch to the faces of other-race
compared with same-race people.
This finding has been supported by other recent studies that also
report racial biases in neural empathic responses. For instance,
activation in the anterior insula cortex [30] and muscle-specific
cortico-spinal inhibition measured by transcranial magnetic
stimulation (TMS) [29] are both greater in response to pictures
of hands in painful situations when those hands are from people of
the same race as the participant compared with a different race.
Furthermore, this effect is correlated with implicit measures of
racial bias [29]. Similarly, in studies of autonomic arousal, reduced
skin conductance responses have been shown when participants
observe pain in other-race people compared with same-race
people [31]. Finally, greater activation within the medial
prefrontal cortex, an area associated with more cognitive aspects
of empathy, has been shown in response to naturalistic visual
scenes depicting emotional suffering of own race relative to other
race people, and the level of this racial bias in neural empathy also
predicted greater altruistic motivation for same-race members
[32].
It has therefore been suggested that, relative to cultural
influences, the modulation of empathy by racial group member-
ship is more fundamental and plays a more pivotal role in shaping
social behaviours, perhaps due to an evolutionary history of
coalitions and alliances between ethnic groups [31,34,42]. The
underlying cause of racial bias in neural empathic responses is,
however, still unknown.
Racial bias in empathic responses may stem from a more broad
or general in-group/out-group bias, rather than being caused by
race per se. Race can help people to define themselves as part of a
specific group, eliciting empathic feelings towards in-group
partners. Thus, activity in the affective areas, associated with
empathic neural responses, may mediate emotions and feelings
shared by the in-group, not implicating explicit consciousness of
these feelings. Indeed, affective feelings towards an in-group
member have been found to increase resource sharing and helping
behaviour among diverse social groups [43] such as political
affiliations [44], sport team allegiances [45], as well as race [46]. In
fact, a recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study
demonstrated an in-group modulation in neural empathic
responses to pain, showing stronger brain activation in the left
anterior insula cortex when participants witnessed pain of an in-
group member (a fan of the same football team) as compared with
an out-group member (a rival team), and this effect was associated
with greater frequency of helping behaviour [47]. This same
pattern of activation in anterior insula has also been found in
response to negative experiences of people belonging to the
participant’s own group compared with those in the rival team
[48]. These studies confirm that similar effects as found in race
modulation of neural empathy are also shown in other forms of
social group categorisation.
The way in which racial bias and broader social group biases
may be related in neural empathic responses has rarely been
examined. Racial bias, however, can be modulated by a more
general in-group bias in other cognitive tasks. Van Bavel and
collaborators have shown this relationship in both behavioural and
neural responses [49–51]. In their studies, participants who were
randomly assigned to a mixed-race (White and Black) group, using
a minimal group paradigm, developed more positive evaluations of
in-group members compared with out-group members in implicit
measures, without any effect of race [49]. Moreover, greater
activation was found in areas associated with face recognition
when observing members of the in-group compared with out-
group, regardless of race [50,51]. While previous studies have
shown racial bias in both implicit tasks and face recognition
[37,52], results of these studies of minimal (mixed-race) groups
suggest that mere categorization with a relatively arbitrary group
may be sufficient to override automatic evaluations and biases
relating to race.
Likewise, the artificial division of people into two groups by a
minimal group paradigm can be sufficient to facilitate in-group
bias in empathy for pain [53]. In a recent study, participants were
shown pictures of painful and non-painful situations and were
asked to judge the level of pain when imagining either themselves,
an in-group member, or an out-group member in that situation.
Pain ratings were significantly greater when participants viewed
pain from an in-group member perspective, suggesting greater
empathic feelings toward in-group members, even when social
group categorisation was non-relevant and arbitrary [53].
Only one recent study has examined relationships between race
and minimal-group biases in neural empathy for pain, using
electroencephalography (EEG) [33]. In this study, Chinese
participants viewed pictures of Chinese and Caucasian actors’
faces with a painful or neutral facial expression. Participants
showed greater activity in early face-related processing compo-
nents of the event-related potentials (ERPs - P2 and N2), but only
in response to Chinese faces. However, when participants were
randomly assigned to one of two mixed-race minimal-groups, the
racial biases in face-processing components were abolished for in-
group faces although still present for out-group faces. Therefore,
mere categorization as an in-group or out-group member can
modulate racial biases seen in the neural processing of facial
emotion. However, as the neural sources of activity are difficult to
localise from EEG studies, it is still not known how racial biases
seen in brain regions important for affective aspects of empathy
may be related to broader group categorisation.
The aim of this study was therefore to examine whether a more
general in-group membership categorization could explain or
modulate the racial bias typically seen in neural empathic
responses to observed pain. We recruited Caucasian Australian
participants and divided them randomly into one of two mixed-
race groups (Caucasian and Chinese). Participants were first
shown pictures and learnt to remember the members of their
‘‘own group’’ and the ‘‘other group’’. Then, during fMRI
measurement, participants were shown brief videos of the faces
of their in-group and out-group members either receiving a painful
or a non-painful touch on the cheek, following the experimental
design of Xu et al [34]. Participants also completed an affective
priming task, using pictures of faces of their in-group and out-
group members as primes, in order to test for implicit association
with their group. We were therefore able to examine whether
neural responses to observed pain, in affective processing regions
of the brain, would be more greatly influenced by the race of the
observed person or by their social categorization as in-group or
out-group members regardless of race.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty Caucasian-Australian participants (8 males; mean
age = 22.5, SE=1.06 years, 2 left-handers) were recruited through
the University of Queensland, and received AU$30 as reimburse-
ment. The criteria to consider participants as Caucasian-Austra-
lian were being born in Australia, having white skin, and having
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Caucasian, Anglo-Saxon parents. All had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and reported no abnormal neurological or
psychiatric history.
Ethics Statement
All participants gave written consent to take part in the study (as
outlined in PLOS consent form) in agreement with the Helsinki
declaration. This study was approved by the Medical Research
Ethics Committee of the University of Queensland. All data were
analyzed anonymously.
Procedure
Each participant attended two experimental sessions in which
they were first assigned to a group and photographed (session 1).
They then undertook fMRI measurement while observing video
clips of painful versus non-painful touch and performed an
affective priming task to test implicit group association (session 2).
Group Assignment
Participants were informed that they were taking part in a study
focusing in the neural responses to other people’s emotion, and
that they would be divided into two groups in order to compare
their brain responses when watching emotions of members of their
group compared with members of another group. We were very
careful to never reveal to participants that the race of in-group and
out-group members was a factor, until after completion of the
study. For group assignment, participants completed a 10-item
questionnaire assessing authoritarian and moral attitudes [54]. We
explicitly told participants that they would be assigned to a group
with people who shared the most similar beliefs and attitudes to
them, and that the other group rated most differently on their
beliefs and attitudes. In reality, group assignment was random.
Participants were also photographed so that their photo could be
included with the members of their group during the subsequent
team learning task.
Team Learning Task
The second session took place between 3 to 5 days after session
1. In this session, participants first completed a learning task that
took approximately 10 minutes. They were told that they would be
shown photos of members of their group and the other group, and
that they should learn and recognize each person so they could
identify who belonged to their group and who belonged to the
other group. Crucially, in each group, there were 2 Caucasian (1
male, 1 female) and 2 Chinese (1 male, 1 female) actors, making 8
actors in total with own-group/other-group, Caucasian/Chinese,
and male/female balanced in a 26262 design. The same
photographs of the 8 actors were used for all participants, but
the actors assigned as own-group or other-group were pseudo-
randomised and counter-balanced between participants so there
could be no overall group bias introduced by the photograph of
any particular actor(s) in the set.
In the initial learning phase, three blocks of trials were displayed
in which the photos of members of the participant’s own team
(including the participant) and the other team were shown
sequentially (stimulus duration 2 s; inter-trial interval 3 s). Below
each photo, the text ‘‘Your Group’’ or ‘‘Other Group’’ was
displayed so that participants could learn the group to which each
actor belonged. The photos of the 8 actors, plus the photo of the
participant, were shown sequentially 3 times each, for a total of 27
trials.
Participants’ recognition performance for the faces was then
tested. Photos of the 8 actors, plus the participant’s own photo,
were presented in random order with no text identifying groups.
Participants reported verbally the group to which the face
belonged by saying ‘‘My group’’ or ‘‘Other group’’. Verbal report
was used rather than button-responses to avoid participants
learning any association between own/other group and left/right
responses which would cause confounds for the later affective
priming task (see below). The participant’s verbal responses were
coded by the experimenter and feedback was given by text
displayed beneath the photo: ‘‘Your Group’’ or ‘‘Other Group’’
displayed in red-font for incorrect responses and in green font for
correct responses. The photos were presented in blocks of 9 trials
(each face presented once in random order), and blocks were
repeated until participants met the criteria for recognition
performance: 4 consecutive blocks (36 trials) performed with less
than 3 errors in total (.90% correct) and 100% correct in the last
block. Participants performed a further 4 test blocks inside the
scanner immediately prior the fMRI task, to ensure that they still
accurately recognized the faces as own-team and other-team
immediately before beginning the fMRI task.
fMRI Task
Inside the scanner, during fMRI measurement, participants
watched short video clips of each of the actors being touched on
the cheek either by a cotton-tip (non-painful touch) or by a syringe
needle (painful touch). The task followed the design of the study of
Xu et al [34]. The stimuli consisted of 32 video clips, each of 3 s
duration, showing faces of the 8 actors with a neutral facial
expression receiving either a painful touch (syringe needle) or non-
painful touch (cotton-tip) to either their right or left cheek (4 video
clips per actor). Importantly, the video clips portrayed only the
cotton-tip or syringe-needle, held by a hand with identical grip,
moving towards the cheek of the actor and ended immediately
upon contact of the cotton-tip or needle with the actor’s cheek, so
that no facial expression of pain or emotional responses of the
actors to the touch were portrayed (Fig. 1). Video clips were
displayed on a projection screen in the bore of the scanner at a
viewing distance of 80 cm, and were viewed by participants via a
mirror attached to the head coil of the scanner. Following each
video clip, participants were instructed to rate how painful they
thought the stimulus looked by pressing one of four buttons on a
button-box held in their right hand, rating from no pain (left
button) to considerable pain (right button). Each of the 32 video
clips were presented once in random order, with each 3 s duration
video clip followed by 9 s of fixation-cross (12 s fixation before the
first video), for a total fMRI run duration of 6 min 40 s.
Participants completed 4 fMRI runs, with the 32 video clips
presented in a different random order in each run.
Implicit Team Association: Affective Priming task
Following fMRI measurement, outside the scanner, participants
performed an affective priming task in order to test for implicit
group association. In this task, the photos of the 8 actors, as used in
the learning and recognition tests, were presented as primes and
paired with words of positive or negative valence. The design of
this task was based on similar previous studies [49,55]. Each trial
started with a blank screen (1000 ms) followed by a fixation cross
(500 ms) as a warning cue. The prime photo was presented
centrally (200 ms), followed by a blank screen (100 ms), and then a
target word of either positive valence (‘charming’, ‘nice’, ‘friendly’,
‘happy’, ‘desirable’, ‘kind’) or negative valence (‘repulsive’, ‘nasty’,
‘evil’, ‘angry’, ‘disturbing’, ‘annoying’) was presented until a
response was made (with 3000 ms maximum time-out). On
presentation of the target word, participants responded by
button-press to classify the word as pleasant or unpleasant as
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quickly as possible, pressing the corresponding button on a 2-
button response box. Reaction times to correctly classify the words
as pleasant or unpleasant were measured as the dependent
variable. The mapping of left/right responses to pleasant/
unpleasant was counterbalanced between participants. After
classifying the word by button-press, participants verbally reported
whether the prime face was a member of their own group or the
other group. This ensured that participants’ attention was drawn
to the group membership of the face when the prime photo was
presented. Verbal report was used for classifying faces as own/
other group so that, as with the earlier recognition test,
participants did not learn any association between left/right
responses and own/other team that might have interfered with
button-press responses to the words in the affective priming task.
Participants performed 96 trials in randomized order, consisting of
each of the 8 photos of actors paired once with each of the 6
pleasant and 6 unpleasant words. Reaction times and accuracy (%
correct) to classify words as pleasant or unpleasant were analyzed
by 3-way ANOVA with factors of Race (Caucasian/Chinese),
Group (in-group/out-group) and Valence (pleasant/unpleasant).
Mauchly’s test of sphericity was checked and Greenhouse-Geisser
corrections for non-sphericity applied where appropriate. Fur-
thermore, we performed Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit
tests over the residuals of the dependent variables in order to check
that the distribution of these data did not deviate significantly from
a normal distribution.
Explicit Team Identification
Finally, participants completed a short questionnaire to assess
the degree to which they explicitly identified with their group and
the other group. Three questions were given: ‘How similar do you
see yourself to be to members of your team?’; ‘How similar do you
see yourself to be to members of the other team?’; ‘To what extent
do you see members of your team and the other team to be similar
to each other?’. Participants answered questions using a 5-point
Likert scale from 1, not at all similar, to 5, very similar.
fMRI image acquisition and analysis
The fMRI data were collected on a 3 Tesla Siemens MRI
scanner. Functional images were acquired using gradient-echo
echo-planar imaging (EPI) with the following parameters: 38
horizontal slices (3 mm slice thickness + 10% inter-slice gap,
interleaved acquisition), repetition time (TR) = 2.5 s; echo time
(TE) = 35 ms; field of view (FOV) = 190 mm; flip angle (FA) = 90u;
matrix of 64664 voxels at 3 mm2 in-plane resolution. 159 brain
volumes were acquired in a run duration of 6 min 40 s, with a
total of 636 volumes acquired over 4 fMRI runs. The first 5 images
of each run were discarded as dummy scans to allow the MR
signal to reach a steady-state. Anatomical T1-weighted images
were also obtained covering the entire brain (TR=1900 ms,
TE=2.3 ms, FA=9u, matrix = 2566256 voxels, slice thick-
ness = 0.9 mm).
Data preprocessing and analysis was performed using SPM8
software (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London,
UK). Slice timing correction was first applied to correct for the
acquisition time differences between slices during the sequential
imaging. The functional images were then spatially realigned to
the first image to correct for head motion between scans. The
anatomical T1 image was first coregistered to the mean functional
image and then spatially normalized to the standard MNI T1
template using the Segment routine of SPM8. This same
registration to MNI space was then applied to all functional
images. Finally, functional images were resliced to 26262 mm
resolution and spatially smoothed using a Gaussian filter of 6 mm
full-width/half-maximum (FWHM). For data analysis, event-
related neural activity was modeled at the onsets of each of the
8 types of videos, convolved with the canonical hemodynamic
response function. The eight conditions modeled were Painful and
Nonpainful touch for each of the 4 types of faces shown:
Caucasian/in-group, Caucasian/out-group, Chinese/in-group
and Chinese/out-group. A set of 5 contrasts were calculated,
comparing Painful versus Nonpainful touch for each of the four
face types separately and Painful versus Nonpainful touch
averaged across all four face types.
For group statistical analysis, whole-brain SPM analysis was
performed using a single-sample t-test to examine the contrast of
painful versus non-painful touch averaged across all faces, using a
voxel-level probability threshold of PFWE,0.005 corrected for
multiple comparisons and a cluster extent threshold of 20 voxels.
This analysis revealed those regions associated with empathy for
pain, showing significantly greater activation when observing
painful compared with nonpainful touch averaged across all face
types. This empathy for pain network was defined as a mask and
used to restrict all subsequent analyses only to voxels within these
regions. In this way, all subsequent analyses of race and group
effects on empathy for pain were conducted only in those brain
regions that showed a significant neural empathic response when
averaged across all faces.
For comparisons between face types, the contrasts of painful
versus nonpainful touch for each of the four types of faces
(Caucasian/in-group, Caucasian/out-group, Chinese/in-group
and Chinese/out-group) were entered into a factorial model and
analysed by 2-way ANOVA, inclusively masked by the contrast of
painful versus non-painful touch averaged across all faces (as
above). Main effects of Race (Caucasian versus Chinese) and
Group (in-group versus out-group) on empathy for pain activation
were examined using a cluster-level probability threshold of
PFWE,0.05, with clusters defined by the voxel-level threshold
Puncorrected,0.001. In those areas showing significant activation
differences across group or race, individual contrast parameter
estimates (i.e. levels of activation) were extracted from the peak
Figure 1. Stimuli used during the fMRI task. Participants watched
video clips depicting Asian or Caucasian actors who represented
members of own-group or other-group receiving either painful (syringe
needle) or non-painful (cotton-bud) touch on the left or right cheek.
Actors included in this figure have given written informed consent for
publication of their photograph, as outlined in the PLOS consent form.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084001.g001
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voxels and plotted to show neural activation levels between the
conditions.
Results
Behavioral Data
Team Learning Task. During the test blocks, participants
on average reached 98% accuracy in categorizing the faces as
members of their group or the other group (SE= 0.66%),
reaching recognition performance criterion on average in 5.25
blocks (SE= 0.54). In the four test blocks performed inside the
MRI, immediately prior scanning, almost all participants per-
formed with 100% accuracy; only three participants made one
error each during the four blocks (97% accuracy). Participants
were therefore highly accurate in identifying the actors as
members of their group or the other group.
fMRI task. While observing the video clips, participants rated
how painful each stimulus looked on a 4-point scale. Videos
showing painful touch were rated as significantly more painful
(M= 3.16; SE= 0.08) than videos showing non-painful touch
overall (M= 1.10; SE= 0.02; Wilcoxon signed rank test, z =
-7.77, p,0.001). In order to test whether race and/or group
membership had an effect on perceived pain ratings, the ratings
given for each of the four face types were analysed separately for
painful and nonpainful touch with Friedman’s tests. For painful
touch, participants ratings were found to differ significantly
between the faces (X(3) = 9.75, p,0.03), but no significant
differences between faces were found for non-painful touch. For
painful touch, the differences in pain ratings between the faces
were further examined by paired comparisons using Wilcoxon
signed ranks tests. These revealed no significant differences but
trends towards higher pain ratings for Caucasian faces compared
with Chinese faces averaged across group (z =21.63, p = 0.102),
and for in-group faces compared with out-group faces averaged
across race (z =21.77, p = 0.077).
Affective Priming task. Reaction times to classify pleasant/
unpleasant words in the affective priming task (Figure 2A, 2B)
were analyzed by 3-way ANOVA with factors of Race (Cauca-
sian/Chinese), Group (in-group/out-group) and Valence (pleas-
ant/unpleasant), with Greenhouse-Geisser correction for non-
sphericity. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of goodness-of-fit indicated
that these data were normally distributed, and so data were not
transformed prior to analysis. ANOVA revealed a significant
interaction between group and valence (F(1,19) = 35.97, p,0.001;
Fig. 2A), but not between race and valence (F(1,19) = 1.37,
p = 0.26; Fig. 2B) and no significant 3-way interaction. Post-hoc
analyses revealed that, when primed by faces of in-group
members, reaction times were significantly shorter to pleasant
words (M= 849 ms, SE= 48 ms) than to unpleasant words (M=
969 ms, SE= 50 ms; F(1,19) = 24.47, p,0.001), whereas when
primed by faces of out-group members, reactions times were
significantly longer to pleasant words (M=1036 ms, SE= 60 ms)
than to unpleasant words (M= 910 ms, SE= 57 ms; F(1,19) =
15.37, p,0.001).
Participants’ accuracy in classifying pleasant/unpleasant words
(Figure 2C, 2D) was also analysed by 3-way ANOVA (with
Greenhouse-Geisser correction) with the same factors. Kolmo-
gorov-Smirnov tests of goodness-of-fit indicated that these data
were normally distributed, and so data were not transformed prior
to analysis. The 3-way ANOVA revealed a significant interaction
between Group and Valence (F(1,19) = 13.403, p,0.002; Fig.2C),
but not between Race and Valence (F(1,19) = 0,012, p = 0.913).
Post-hoc analysis revealed identical effects to those found for
reaction times: for in-group face primes, percentage accuracy was
significantly higher classifying pleasant words (M= 98%, SE=
0.7%) than unpleasant words (M= 87%, SE= 3.9%; F(1,19) =
8.89, p,0.008), whereas for out-group face primes, accuracy was
significantly poorer classifying pleasant words (M= 87.71%, SE=
3.44%) than unpleasant words (M= 95%, SE= 2.1%, F(1, 19) =
4.19, p,0.05). Taken together, these results indicate participants
associated ‘‘pleasant’’ with in-group faces, showing faster and
more accurate responses to pleasant words when primed by in-
group faces, and associated ‘‘unpleasant’’ with out-group faces,
showing faster and more accurate responses to unpleasant words
when primed by out-group faces.
Explicit Team Identification
Participants gave significantly higher ratings for how similar
they judged themselves to be relative to members of their own
team (M= 3.05, SE= 0.2) than members of the other group (M=
2.50, SE= 0.18), Wilcoxon signed rank test, z =22.81, p,0.005.
Overall, these results show that the minimal group paradigm
used in this study did result in participants associating more with
their in-group than the out-group, as assessed by both implicit and
explicit measures of group identification.
fMRI data
Observing painful compared with non-painful touch, averaged
across all faces, involved significantly greater activation in regions
of the supplementary motor area (SMA), mid cingulate cortex and
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), as well as activation bilaterally in
the anterior insula (AI) (Fig. 3). Significantly greater activation was
also found in primary and secondary somatosensory areas,
involving the postcentral gyrus, supramarginal gyrus, and inferior
parietal cortex (IPC) (Fig. 3). These included areas 1, 2, 3a, 3b,
OP1 and OP4, and parietal operculum as defined by cytoarchi-
tectonic probability maps from the SPM Anatomy Toolbox [56].
Finally, greater activation for painful touch was also found in right
cerebellar areas, the left inferior frontal gyrus, and left inferior
occipital gyrus (see Table 1).
To examine differences in empathic neural responses to pain
between the four types of faces, contrasts comparing Group (own-
group versus other-group) and Race (Caucasian versus Chinese)
were examined, inclusively masked by the contrast above (i.e. in
regions that showed significant neural empathic responses
averaged across all faces). For Group comparisons, there were
no areas that showed significantly greater activation when
observing painful versus non-painful touch in own-group members
compared with other-group members, or vice-versa, even if using
a more lenient uncorrected threshold of P,0.001. Thus, group
membership of the observed actor did not significantly modulate
empathic neural responses to observed painful touch. However,
regarding Race, significantly greater activity was found in the left
anterior insula cortex when participants observed painful versus
non-painful touch in actors of the same race compared with actors
of the other race (cluster-PFWE,0.05, peak T= 4.08, MNI
coordinates: 228, 24, 8; Fig. 3). The left AI was the only area
to show this racial bias effect at the corrected probability
threshold; however, a number of other areas showed similar
activation differences at the same voxel-level threshold (Puncor-
rected,0.001), but with smaller clusters not reaching the corrected
cluster-level statistical threshold. These regions (Fig. 3) included
the IPC (peak T= 3.73, MNI coordinates: 234, 234, 38), the left
postcentral gyrus (peak T= 3.73, MNI coordinates: 238, 224,
58), the SMA (peak T= 3.28, MNI coordinates: =26, 14, 58), and
the ACC (peak T= 3.21, MNI coordinates = 12, 24, 28). There
were no areas that showed significantly greater activation for
painful versus non-painful touch in other-race faces compared
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with own-race faces, even at the more lenient uncorrected
threshold, P,0.001.
In order to further test for possible sub-threshold differences in
neural empathy to in-group versus out-group members, we
extracted parameter estimates from the peak voxels in those
regions showing racial bias in neural empathy and further
analysed by 2-way ANOVA (effectively using an uncorrected
threshold P,0.05 in those selected regions of interest). Results
revealed no main effects of Group in any of those areas (left AI,
F(1,19) = 0.007, p = 0.934; ACC, F(1,19) = 2.964, p = 0.101; SMA,
F(1,19) = 0.309, p= 0.585; IPC, F(1,19) = 0.021, p = 0.886 and
postcentral gyrus, F(1,19) = 1.573, p = 0.225), and also no signif-
icant interactions between Race and Group in any of those areas
(left AI, F(1,19) = 0.208, p = 0.654; ACC, F(1,19) = 0.023,
p = 0.881; SMA, F(1,19) = 0.122, p = 0.73; IPC, F(1,19) = 0.619,
p = 0.441 and postcentral gyrus, F(1,19) = 0.244, p = 0.627). We
found only significant main effects of Race in all areas, consistent
with the whole-brain analysis.
Discussion
Overall, when participants witnessed others receiving painful
versus non-painful touch, we found enhanced activation in the
core neural network for pain empathy, including somatosensory
and affective-motivational aspects of pain processing, consistent
with previous results in empathy-for-pain research [57]. Crucially,
while group assignment clearly led to greater association with in-
group rather than out-group members in both explicit and implicit
measures, we found no significant group bias in the neural
response to observed pain. Instead, neural empathic responses
showed only a significant race bias, regardless of group, with
activation in the left insula cortex significantly greater when
observing painful touch in same-race compared with other-race
Figure 2. Mean reaction times (top) and % Correct (bottom) in the Affective Priming Task. All 20 participants performed 96 trials on the
Affective Priming Task, in which they made button-press responses to classify words as ‘‘pleasant’’ (grey bars) or ‘‘unpleasant’’ (white bars) when
primed by faces of each of the 8 actors: either In-group or Out-group members (Left; A and C) and either Caucasian or Chinese faces (Right; B and D).
Participants were significantly faster and more accurate classifying words as ‘‘pleasant’’ than ‘‘unpleasant’’ when primed by faces of In-Group
members. Conversely, participants were significantly faster and more accurate classifying words as ‘‘unpleasant’’ than ‘‘pleasant’’ when primed by
Out-group members. There were no significant differences in response times or accuracy classifying words primed by Caucasian versus Chinese faces.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084001.g002
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actors, consistent with previous studies [34]. Other regions
typically reported as part of the neural empathy for pain matrix,
including the anterior cingulate and left somatosensory areas, also
showed a similar trend towards racial bias (although the size of
these clusters was not large enough to reach our strict cluster-
corrected threshold for statistical significance).
Figure 3. Activation results in the fMRI task. Significantly greater activitation when observing painful versus non-painful touch was found in the
left anterior insula (LAI), right anterior insula (RAI), postcentral gyrus (PCG), supramarginal gyrus (SG), and in the supplementary motor area and
anterior cingulate (SMA/ACC). Significant differences when viewing painful touch in Caucasian versus Chinese faces were found only in the left
anterior insula, with no differences between In-Group versus Out-Group faces (cluster-level PFWE,0.05; parameter estimates plotted below left).
Similar effects in the SMA/ACC failed to reach significance but are shown here for comparison (at voxel-level Puncorrected,0.001; parameter estimates
below right).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084001.g003
Table 1. Brain regions showing significantly greater activation for painful touch compared with non-painful touch,
averaged across all faces.
MNI coordinates
Region x y z t value Cluster size (N6 of voxels)
R Anterior Insula 36 28 2 7.55 274
L Anterior Insula 228 22 212 6.68 191
SMA and MCC 28 20 42 7.03 660
ACC 210 30 26 5.80 36
Postcentral Gyrus 238 224 56 6.85 75
Supramarginal Gyrus 260 222 28 6.90 194
Inferior Parietal Cortex 232 252 46 6.24 102
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 256 10 10 5.26 21
Inferior Occipital Gyrus 242 266 210 7.06 234
Cerebellum 36 260 228 5.78 95
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084001.t001
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Race has been demonstrated as a feature impossible to ignore in
facial processing [38,58–60], even when race is implicit and not
relevant to the participant’s task. Thus, it is possible that race may
cause an automatic and bottom-up bias in empathic neural
activation to pain. It may be that the neural processing for
differentiation of race operates at a more basic level than broader
social distinctions. Previous ERP studies have shown that racial
information is extracted and encoded from faces at a very early
stage of facial processing, as early as 120 ms in the N100
component of the ERP, before the analysis of more complex social
categories [58–60]. Hence, this automatic and rapid encoding of
race in the brain may be underlying the current results.
It is possible that early effects of race in facial processing might
be due to differing physical features of faces according to race,
such as color, shape and size [61]. The anterior insula and anterior
cingulate cortex that show a racial bias in neural empathy are also
known to be sensitive to salient physical features of a stimulus and
bottom-up information processing [62]. In contrast, group
membership in our paradigm was not associated with any salient
physical features that might elicit early and automatic responses
that could modulate effects of race. Thus, in our paradigm, the
more complex social categorisation of group valence could only be
detected in later stages of processing after the recognition of facial
identity and matching with remembered in-group and out-group
members. Therefore, it is possible that earlier neural processing of
race based on physical features rather than other complex social
categories as in our minimal-group paradigm may regulate the
neural empathic responses to observed pain.
In the study by Sheng and Han [33], empathic neural activity
was modulated by both race and group membership when salient
physical cues (different color t-shirts) were used to identify in-group
and out-group members. Such salient physical cues may facilitate
an automatic and early identification of in-group members that
could compete with low-level visual features of faces corresponding
to race to influence neural empathic responses. While in our study
participants were highly accurate in recognizing individuals as in-
group and out-group members, based on facial identity, providing
low-level cues for group membership may be necessary for such
arbitrary group categorization to influence early neural processes
and modulate the racial bias in empathy for pain. Han et al., [28]
also found that observing neutral faces in painful situations elicited
stronger empathic neural activation than observing painful facial
expressions in the same situation (being touched by a syringe on
the cheek, similar to our task). It may be that this strong activation
to painful situations, without concurrent processing of emotional
facial expressions, is less influenced by group manipulation. In the
study of Sheng and Han [33], painful and neutral facial
expressions were used to represent painful and non-painful
conditions. Previous studies have shown that processing of facial
expressions, with more complex characteristics than neutral faces,
recruits areas involved in mentalizing and theory of mind such as
the medial prefrontal cortex and inferior frontal gyrus [63,64].
Perception of nociceptive touch, however, may stem more directly
from sensori-motor activity, perhaps involving ‘‘mirroring’’
mechanisms [65], that may be less influenced by higher-order
social group categorization.
Since the anterior insula cortex is involved in the integration
and representation of interoceptive and affective information and
the anterior cingulate cortex is its motivational and action
empathic counterpart [66,67], race bias in these areas suggests a
decrease in affective-automatic response to pain in other-race
faces. This is consistent with previous studies that have shown the
involvement of the anterior cingulate and anterior insula in
emotional face processing (for a review see [68,69] ), as well as in
racial discrimination in its affective and cognitive processing
(e.g.[70–72]). Likewise, brain areas that are densely connected
with the insula such as the amygdala and parahippocampal cortex
[73–76], show differing activation in response to same versus
other-race faces [37,77–79], suggesting differentiation in the
processing of races in both emotional and cognitive aspects.
Furthermore, ERP studies have shown that racial bias in neural
empathic responses to painful facial expressions occurs early in
processing, around 200 ms after stimulus onset over frontal areas
and localized to the anterior cingulate [33]. Taken together, this
would imply an automatic and bottom-up bias in affective
processing of empathy driven by the race of a face.
Besides race, there are many other factors that can also
modulate empathic responses to pain, involving complex mech-
anisms such as contextual appraisal or evaluation of intentions that
are associated with the cognitive dimension of empathy [9,11,13].
Indeed, studies that have investigated the modulation of neural
empathic activity based on culture and more complex social
constructs have reported additional recruitment of cognitive areas,
reflecting a more complex and top-down regulation of empathy
[32,80]. A recent study of intentional empathy showed no racial
bias in neural empathic responses to facial emotions, but
additional recruitment of inferior frontal regions independent of
race when intentionally empathizing with the observed emotional
state [81]. This suggests that cognitive aspects of empathy may
involve engagement of more prefrontal cortical regions and
regulate the more automatic emotional empathic responses that
appear to be sensitive to race.
It is also possible that modulation of racial bias in the affective
brain regions requires more meaningful or established social
categorisation than the minimal group paradigm. For example, a
recent study by Bruneau et al. [82] examined neural activity of
Arabian, Israeli, and South American participants in response to
the pain and suffering of people from each group. Their results
showed that, behaviorally, there was a reduction in the partici-
pants’ compassion towards the conflict group (i.e. Arab to Israeli
and vice-versa), but not for the distant group (Arab and Israeli to
South American and vice-versa). At the neural level, fMRI showed
greater activation in areas associated with cognitive aspects of
empathy, such as the medial prefrontal cortex, in response to the
conflict group but not to the distant group. These results show how
more complex group categorization, rather than simple minimal
groups or race alone, can modulate cognitive aspects of empathy
and perhaps exert top-down control over empathic responses to
observed pain of others. Empathy has been proposed as an
evolutionary mechanism to facilitate pro-social motivation and
behavior toward conspecifics [83,84], and it is widely accepted
that social group membership is involved in the elicitation of
empathic feelings and altruism [43–47]. However, it seems that
artificial and arbitrary groups, as in a minimal group paradigm,
are not sufficient to override racial bias in empathy. It should be
noted that our group assignment was not strictly ‘‘minimal’’ as we
also told participants that they shared similar beliefs and attitudes
as others in their group; however, even so this was not sufficient to
influence the neural responses to observed pain.
In our study, we found significant group biases when measured
on implicit and explicit tasks assessing group association behav-
iourally. These results are important to show that our group
assignment was effective in inducing greater association or
identification with in-group members than out-group members.
While these behavioural results may at first seem at odds with the
fMRI activation results, in which no group biases were found, the
affective priming task and explicit ratings were not measures of
empathy towards in-group versus out-group members. Therefore,
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while our affective priming task showed that participants implicitly
associated positively with in-group members and negatively with
out-group members in general, this group association did not
influence the neural empathic responses shown by participants to
observed pain of in-group compared with out-group members.
The pain ratings in the fMRI task showed no significant
differences, but trends towards higher ratings of pain to faces of
same-race compared with other-race individuals, as well as in-
group compared with out-group members. These pain ratings are
the most equivalent behavioral measure to the neural empathic
responses measured in the fMRI task. Unfortunately these
measures were not very sensitive, rated only on a 4-point scale
(with 4-button response pad inside the MRI scanner), but they did
show a trend towards racial bias in empathy consistent with the
fMRI results.
It is still an open question, how racial differences cause changes
in neural empathic responses. It may be that we are innately tuned
to the perception of people who are ‘‘like us’’ [85]. Alternately,
neural empathic responses to other races or groups may change
with familiarity. We are generally more familiar with people of our
own race than other races, which may facilitate the recognition of
facial expressions and emotions [86], although in the current
study, all faces displayed neutral expressions and so results cannot
simply be due to differences in the perception of facial expressions
across races. In a recent fMRI study, Azevedo et al. [30],
examined empathic neural responses as participants observed
same-race and other-race hands, as well as totally unfamiliar violet
hands, receiving painful touch. Even though participants showed
stronger activation in response to own race hands compared with
the other hands in pain, they also showed increased activation in
medial cingulate cortex and greater autonomic responses to other-
race hands compared with the completely unfamiliar violet hand.
Further studies are needed, however, to elucidate the role of
familiarity in racial biases in neural empathy.
In summary, here we have shown a racial bias in neural
empathic responses to pain in the left insula cortex (and similar
trends in the anterior cingulate and somatosensory areas),
confirming findings from a number of previous studies regarding
racial biases in affective-motivational aspects of empathy [29–34].
Furthermore, we found that this racial bias persists and is not
influenced by in-group bias in a minimal group context, even
though participants clearly showed implicit and explicit identifi-
cation with their minimal in-group rather than their racial group
behaviourally. These results are consistent with an early and
automatic brain response to observed pain that is modulated by
race, and less influenced by meaningless or minimal group
association. Importantly, behavioural measures in our study
suggest that despite this racial bias in early neural responses,
racial biases are not always reflected in our ultimate behaviour.
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